OT: He's gone.

David Nutter

Epetruk <nobody@blackhole.com> said:

> First of all, I notice that in your reply, you've made the assumption that
> the technology to forge cards *will* be widely and cheaply available,
> without attempting to substantiate this.

However, you assume that the technology won't be cracked or broken. A far
more dangerous assumption considering the enforcement weight that ID cards
are supposed to bear. Trust of a potentially broken system being more
damaging than distrust of a potentially OK system...

ID cards will be at best irrelevant and at worst damaging.

*snip*

Regards,

-david

Jon Senior

Epetruk wrote:
> First of all, I notice that in your reply, you've made the assumption that
> the technology to forge cards *will* be widely and cheaply available,
> without attempting to substantiate this.

There is a way past every security system in place today. Most of them
involve handing reasonably to very large sums of money to someone on the
inside. If the technology to create the cards exists, the technology to
forge them will, and if you're relying on public-private key technology
to provide the security, remember that the private key only needs to be
leaked once to invalidate the entire scheme.

<snip>

> I honestly don't know how things will pan out. What I *do* care about (and
> sadly what you failed to answer) is how to deal with the problem of ID
> theft. If it turns out that biometric ID cards are not the answer to this,
> fine. But I prefer to wait and see what happens rather than making
> predictions about the future of a technology that is still in its infancy.

How to deal with ID theft:

1) Destroy bank statements, utility bills etc, rather than simply throw
them away.
2) If you ever receive a letter from the DVLA (Or similar) asking you to
confirm an address change, reply immediately to deny it (Unless you
really did move!).
3) If you're really concerned, cut up your credit cards and make all
payments in cash (It's harder to obtain information about cash purchases).

There are many more. They boil down to thinking about the possible
consequences of your actions WRT to the transfer of personal
information. The more paranoid you are, the more care you should take.
Or you could not worry about it too much and wonder whether it is not a
solution desperately seeking a problem.

Jon

Trevor Barton

Epetruk wrote:
> Trevor Barton wrote:
>
>>Epetruk wrote:
>>
>>>Chris Malcolm wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>"Epetruk" <nobody@blackhole.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Simon Brooke wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>in message <32dgacF3itl49U1@individual.net>, Epetruk
>>>>>>('nobody@blackhole.com') wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>>>I don't see the value of ID cards as a terrorist prevention
>>>>>>>measure - quite frankly, I can't understand that argument. To me,
>>>>>>>they are more valuable in preventing identity theft (which I
>>>>>>>believe is going to be a big issue in the future) and benefit
>>>>>>>fraud.
>>>>
>>>>>>Surely they _enable_ identity theft? If I steal your ID card, how
>>>>>>are you going to prove you're you and I'm not?
>>>>
>>>>>If someone steals my biometric ID card and put their biometrics on
>>>>>the card, this may not be enough. For example, the issuer of the
>>>>>card could encrypt the biometric information on the card using two
>>>>>different private keys
>>>>>that are available only to the issuing organisation, and the card
>>>>>readers would use the public key of the issuer to decrypt the
>>>>>information before
>>>>>it could be verified against the biometrics of the card holder. The
>>>>>challenge
>>>>>for the forger is now to get hold of these private keys - not
>>>>>impossible, but very difficult.
>>>>
>>>>The trouble with arguments which go "This is virtually impossible to
>>>>crack" is that they depend on lots of assumptions.
>>>
>>>
>>>And I keep on repeating that I don't think 100% impossibility is
>>>attainable - what is required is a level good enough to ensure that
>>>for the vast majority of purposes, the technology does what it is
>>>supposed to do (i.e. in this case prevent the vast majority of
>>>people from easily forging ID cards).
>>>
>>>Yes, determined criminals might want to forge these cards, but what
>>>would the point be? As I have said elsewhere, I *don't* see the ID
>>>card as being used as the *only* required form of ID for *all*
>>>transactions. The more important the transaction, the more forms of
>>>evidence of ID should be required (as obtains today). What I *am*
>>>saying is that including a biometric ID card as one of the forms of
>>>this evidence would reduce the occurrences of ID theft.
>>
>>And I'm saying it would make bugger all difference :-)
>>
>>You are looking at it (if I can be blunt to save typing) from the
>>point of view of a person who knows nothing about it in a technical
>>sense. However, there are a lot of people out there who do know about
>>things like that, and only one of them has to be (a) bad and (b) able
>>to crack, forge, break, whatever, the system. Once it has been
>>broken, it's broken for good.
>
>
> Do you know for *sure* that biometric technology is as insecure as this

Yes. Apart fro the fact it's blindingly obvious, I am a technologist in
a related profession.

>, or
> are you making an assumption based on related forms of technology?

No.

> It seems
> you are assuming that the means of 'breaking the system' will be as
> cheaply/widely available as programs for hacking computers - this may well
> not be the case.

But experience, knowledge, and past practice suggests it will be. Past
practice, in this case, being over many hundrds of years.

> Like I said, the technology is still in its infancy. We're some way away
> from it being deployed for commercial use - in fact, the fact that
> businesses are wary of using it right now indicates that its adoption by the
> government is premature. But unless you are an expert in that field of
> security yourself (and even if you are), I don't think you can confidently
> make the assertion that biometric technology will *always* suffer from the
> once-broken-always-broken problem.

Always is a long long time. However, security has been around for a
long long time. And as long as it has been round, people have been able
to crack it. It sounds a bit trite to say, but it's nevertheless true,
that anything one person can device another can break. That's always
been true, and it's unlikely to be false for the well foreseeable
future. How secure do you really think your bank transactions are? Not
very, if I throw a million quid at the problem. DO you know how much
money banks lose each year to electronic fraud?

> But if you want to believe that ID cards won't solve the problem of ID
> theft, that's fine. As I've said, I'm agnostic about these things - if
> someone were to propose an alternative, I'd willingly listen. Do you have
> any ideas, or do you believe that ID theft is something we will just have to
> get used to?

No, I have no working alternative. However, it's very clear that the
proposed system will fail to do what it's supposed to. Therefore, don't
waste my hard earned taxes on it. Especially when it comes with plenty
of downsides, particularly privacy and civil liberties ones.

--
Trevor Barton

Epetruk

Jon Senior wrote:
> Epetruk wrote:
>> Why are they worthless if they don't conclusively identify you?
>> Like I've said throughout this thread, it is *impossible* to achieve
>> 100% conclusive identification - the advantage I see in ID cards is
>> that they offer a stronger proof that you are who you say you are
>> (in addition to existing evidence).
>
> But the more conclusively that they can ID you, the greater acceptance
> of them as evidence there will be and the greater the problem will be
> if they can be falsified. NB: This is a problem with the overall
> concept of ID cards, not the technology.

Jon,

Surely it's not enough for the card simply to be able to ID you? I would
assume that the difficulty in forging the card should also be raised to
acceptable levels. There's no point in having a card which IDs A as A when,
for all you know, A might really be B because B has easily got hold of a
forged ID card.

Let me ensure I understand what you mean when you say "the greater
acceptance
of them as evidence there will be and the greater the problem will be if
they can be falsified". Is this like the scenario where people believe that
DNA at the scene of a crime conclusively proves that the owner of the DNA
committed the crime, no matter whatever evidence is available?

Do you not believe that this would be less of an issue if people regard
biometric ID cards as simply *ONE* of many items of evidence needed to
establish your identity, albeit a very efficient one? Or do you think that
human beings are naturally lazy and will default to accepting the ID card
without doing further checks?

>> Well, I've also said elsewhere that [reliance on biometric IDs alone]
>> shouldn't be the case.
>
> If they don't remove the requirement for additional proof of ID then
> they have gained you (the user) nothing at additional cost to both
> your wallet and your liberty. If they do... then the problem detailed
> above exists. In essence they are either a threat due to abuse, or
> worthless. I have watched this field for many years and have to find
> a middle ground between these two positions.

I don't quite understand why you haven't gained anything if the requirement
for additional proof of ID remains. What you have is a more reliable form of
ID added to existing forms of ID, which should ensure that the person is
more likely to be who he says he is if he presents all forms of ID. As to
cost - yes, that is an issue, which is why in my second post on this topic,
I say that the technology is still too expensive to be introduced.

I'm not sure I understand you liberty argument - how I feel the cards should
be used is purely to say that 'you are X'. I don't see the need to store any
other information besides that in a central database. And really, the
information held on the database could purely be for the purposes of
ensuring that no attempt is being made to create duplicate identities. Could
you please expand on the liberty question?

Thanks,

--
Akin

aknak at aksoto dot idps dot co dot uk

Epetruk

David Nutter wrote:
> Epetruk <nobody@blackhole.com> said:
>
>> First of all, I notice that in your reply, you've made the
>> assumption that the technology to forge cards *will* be widely and
>> cheaply available, without attempting to substantiate this.
>
> However, you assume that the technology won't be cracked or broken.

I don't hold this view. What I have said is that I don't know whether
breaking the technology will invalidate the reliability of the cards to the
point where they are worthless.


--
Akin

aknak at aksoto dot idps dot co dot uk

Trevor Barton

Epetruk wrote:
> Tim Woodall wrote:
>
>>On Fri, 17 Dec 2004 19:05:33 -0000,
>> Epetruk <nobody@blackhole.com> wrote:
>>
>>>But if you want to believe that ID cards won't solve the problem of
>>>ID theft, that's fine. As I've said, I'm agnostic about these things
>>>- if someone were to propose an alternative, I'd willingly listen.
>>>Do you have any ideas, or do you believe that ID theft is something
>>>we will just have to get used to?
>>>
>>
>>I believe that ID cards will make ID theft EASIER. Most people will
>>just accept them as proof. Want to buy alcohol underage - just borrow
>>someones card that looks a bit like you (or print one/get one printed
>>on one of the websites that will inevitably grow up) OK so it won't
>>have the chip, a good (say 2-3GBP to produce forgery) will have the
>>contacts though. And I thought underage drinking was a problem.
>
>
> First of all, I notice that in your reply, you've made the assumption that
> the technology to forge cards *will* be widely and cheaply available,
> without attempting to substantiate this.

Of course it will be. It won't cast much to produce a valid card, only
a few pounds. Why do you think it'll costany more to produce a
fraudulent one? What might cost, is the development of the method. OK,
so it costs someone one million - no let's say 100 million quid. Then
use it to steal 2 quid from each person in the country - clear 20
million in profit.
>
> But I'll repeat what I've said elsewhere already:
>
> Generally, people will ask for proof of evidence in proportion to the
> seriousness or importance of the issue concerned. So for a pint down at the
> pub, yes - a biometric ID card should be enough. I would wonder though
> whether someone would go to the trouble of forging a biometric ID card
> solely for this purpose.

But don't you wonder why we should have to prove or identity to buy a
pint? Does it worry you that you even suggested the possibility of
using an ID card, and I repeat *ID card*, to buy a pint in a pub?

> For more serious issues (like opening an account), the biometric ID card and
> some other forms of ID would be required - just like what happens today. And
> for court-related issues, I don't expect that an ID card by itself should be
> enough to convict you of a crime (even though it might be contributory
> evidence).

And therefore there is no point in the ID card. Stick with the "other
forms" as we do today. If an ID card is not sufficient in itself, there
is no point in it. Don't spend time, effort and money devising yet
another form of ID if it is not going to work in itself.

> But the usage of the ID card anyway would depend very much on how reliable
> it was. If it was demonstrated to the public that a biometric ID card could
> easily be forged and was an unreliable form of identification, then of
> course it wouldn't even be accepted down the pub. On the other hand, if the
> hype about its forgeability proved to be just that - hype - then people
> would rely on it more.
>
> I honestly don't know how things will pan out. What I *do* care about (and
> sadly what you failed to answer) is how to deal with the problem of ID
> theft. If it turns out that biometric ID cards are not the answer to this,
> fine. But I prefer to wait and see what happens rather than making
> predictions about the future of a technology that is still in its infancy.

Well, I don't know how to deal with it. However, I do know how not to deal
with it. It's called an ID card.


--
Trevor Barton

David Nutter

Simon Brooke <simon@jasmine.org.uk> said:

> We live in an incredibly hypocritical society. Journalists whose own
> private lives would not bear great scrutiny heap scorn on people in
> public life. This isn't good. Politicians are human; they have
> emotions, needs, desires. It's not reasonable to expect them to live
> like monks. What we need is that they should be honest, competent and
> straightforward. If we make the job of politics so unpleasant that only
> seriously dodgy people are prepared to do it, we will get seriously
> dodgy people. Politicians, too, have a right to a private life.

To a certain extent. I expect those directly placing themselves on a
pedestal (in a way which monarchs and other hereditary types do not) to
adhere to a higher behavioural standard than that of the general population.
A Blunkett having an affair is unpleasant, but forgivable. A Blunkett having
an affair with a married woman after making various moralistics
pronouncements about family life is unforgivable.

I am glad this odious excuse for a statesman is gone, though like you I
would've preferred a resignation consequent upon his dreadful policies
rather than his "private" life.

Regards,

-david, regretting being drawn into this

Epetruk

Trevor Barton wrote:
> Epetruk wrote:
>> Tim Woodall wrote:
>>

>> Generally, people will ask for proof of evidence in proportion to the
>> seriousness or importance of the issue concerned. So for a pint down
>> at the pub, yes - a biometric ID card should be enough. I would
>> wonder though whether someone would go to the trouble of forging a
>> biometric ID card solely for this purpose.
>
> But don't you wonder why we should have to prove or identity to buy a
> pint? Does it worry you that you even suggested the possibility of
> using an ID card, and I repeat *ID card*, to buy a pint in a pub?

I was just using an example that you'd used. Were you being sarcastic?

>> For more serious issues (like opening an account), the biometric ID
>> card and some other forms of ID would be required - just like what
>> happens today. And for court-related issues, I don't expect that an
>> ID card by itself should be enough to convict you of a crime (even
>> though it might be contributory evidence).
>
> And therefore there is no point in the ID card. Stick with the "other
> forms" as we do today. If an ID card is not sufficient in itself,
> there is no point in it. Don't spend time, effort and money devising
> yet another form of ID if it is not going to work in itself.

As I said elsewhere, I don't think the fact that the card isn't sufficient
in itself means there's no point in it if it does the job better than
existing forms of ID. But I suspect that you feel so strongly about ID cards
(especially because of the civil liberties argument which I'm afraid I don't
fully understand) that there's not very much I can say to sway your opinion
on this. So we'll have to agree to disagree on this.

Carol Hague

dirtylitterboxofferingstospammers <wafflycathcs@aol.compomcom> wrote:

> I don't mind at all. If you are younger, slimmer and prettier than me
> (entirely likely) I wouldn't mind being mistaken for you ;-)

Younger, possibly. Slimmer, I very much doubt - I'm a small round
person. Prettier, probably not - there's a mugshot here:-

http://www.wrhpv.com/about_us/index.html

if you're feeling brave - I'm the one who isn't a big blue fish :-)

--
Carol
"Mmmmooooowooooff!" - the Moobark, "The Treacle People"

Colin

Epetruk wrote:
> What I *am* saying is that including a
> biometric ID card as one of the forms of this evidence would reduce the
> occurrences of ID theft.

But surely only if the biometrics are checked against the person? In the
case of credit cards, loans, HP etc., which AIUI is where most identity
theft takes place, then the banks would have to install the biometric
scanning devices, train staff to operate them, have access to the
centralised database to check the data, insist everyone applying for
credit turned up for their scan. This raises the issues:
Would the financial institutions trust a system which they didn't
control? What the the cost be? (I wouldn't be surprised if it would be
more than the current cost of ID theft.) How many customers (read -
money) would they lose because of the extra effort required to get a
credit card or a loan? I don't see the banks being very keen on using
biometric ID cards to prevent ID theft, purely from a financial
viewpoint. About the only plus points I can see is it should reduce
amount of "you have already been approved for a credit card" junk coming
through the door, and it might help prevent quite so many people getting
into crippling debt because the process of getting a credit card / loan
would be made that much more inconvenient.

--
Colin

Epetruk

Colin wrote:
> Epetruk wrote:
>> What I *am* saying is that including a
>> biometric ID card as one of the forms of this evidence would reduce
>> the occurrences of ID theft.
>
> But surely only if the biometrics are checked against the person? In
> the case of credit cards, loans, HP etc., which AIUI is where most
> identity theft takes place, then the banks would have to install the
> biometric scanning devices, train staff to operate them, have access
> to the centralised database to check the data, insist everyone
> applying for credit turned up for their scan. This raises the issues:
> Would the financial institutions trust a system which they didn't
> control? What the the cost be? (I wouldn't be surprised if it would be
> more than the current cost of ID theft.) How many customers (read -
> money) would they lose because of the extra effort required to get a
> credit card or a loan? I don't see the banks being very keen on using
> biometric ID cards to prevent ID theft, purely from a financial
> viewpoint.

Good points. In fact, since I seem to be getting a battering from all sides,
I should repeat that I'm actually *not* in support of the government plan to
roll out ID cards as planned, because I believe the current biometric
technology is neither *effective* nor *affordable* enough.

Trevor Barton

Jon Senior wrote:
> Trevor Barton wrote:
>
>> that's why the average time between a freshly installed windows
>> computer being connected to the internet and it being hacked is now 20
>> *minutes*.
>
>
> Is it that long? When my mate installed his ADSL modem from BT
> (Following their instructions to the letter) it failed to offer an
> opportunity to enable the firewall before connecting. He saw:
>
> Now establishing your connection...
> Connection established.
> Error blah-di-blah at such-an-address. Closing for reboot in 20 second.
> 19... etc.
>
> We were actually quite impressed. Time from connection to hack was < 1
> second!

Well, an average is a average. Some PC's might last an hour or more!

--
Trevor Barton

Jon Senior

Epetruk wrote:
> As I said elsewhere, I don't think the fact that the card isn't sufficient
> in itself means there's no point in it if it does the job better than
> existing forms of ID.

You decide to open a bank account. Your bank declares that you need
three forms of ID, A, B & C.

You have an ID card (D) which can replace one of the above. What exactly
have you gained? You still need three pieces of ID.

It does however cost you money (Probably more than you'd expect since
your taxes will also be paying for it in addition to the out-of-pocket
costs!).

> But I suspect that you feel so strongly about ID cards
> (especially because of the civil liberties argument which I'm afraid I don't
> fully understand) that there's not very much I can say to sway your opinion
> on this. So we'll have to agree to disagree on this.

The civil liberties argument is as follows. Why should anyone have the
right to confirm your identity for no reason?

If you have an ID card scheme, then to be worthwhile (For combatting
crime, terrorism etc) it must be compulsory. If it is compulsory then
there must a law against not owning one. If you allow people to keep
them at home, then it is impossible to track down those who claim
they'll bring it in to the police station then don't. So it must be
compulsory to carry one. At this point the police gain the power to stop
you and demand to see your ID.

The police are human. They are also predominantly (It would appear)
white, and male. They have a track record of misusing their power to
harass minorities. You are proposing to hand them another tool with
which to do the same. This is a Bad Thing (TM).

The above assumes that the Right to Demand ID isn't extended beyond the
police.

If you haven't already, I would strongly suggest reading 1984 and paying
close attention to how the police state came into being.

Jon

Jon Senior

Epetruk wrote:
> Good points. In fact, since I seem to be getting a battering from all sides,
> I should repeat that I'm actually *not* in support of the government plan to
> roll out ID cards as planned, because I believe the current biometric
> technology is neither *effective* nor *affordable* enough.

But those of us that are battering you (Sorry. Don't take it
personally), are trying to show why ID cards (in general) are at best
unnecessary, and at worst a danger. The problems are not limited to the
current scheme.

Jon