OT: He's gone.

Mark Thompson

> On social justice, the
> disparity between rich and poor is wider, and getting wider faster.

As long as the poor are still getting richer that's fine by me.

And hey, at least it's the kind-of meaningless 'relative' poverty we're
concerned about, rather than real poverty.

David Martin

On 16/12/04 1:18 pm, in article 32dgacF3itl49U1@individual.net, "Epetruk"
<nobody@blackhole.com> wrote:

> In any case, nobody is saying (or should be saying) that ID cards should
> be unforgeable - they should just be good enough to establish one's
> identity to such a degree that the chances of you being someone else
> are minimal.

They will either be 'good enough' because they can be checked back at a
central database, or they will be forgeable.

If they are to be used for identity, why not just throw away the card part
and retain comparing the biometric data with that stored centrally. After
all, there is little chance of failing to carry biometric data with you.
< I know you lost your arm in an accident last week Mr Smith but I'm
arresting you for failing to carry the required biometric data >

...d

David Martin

On 16/12/04 1:21 pm, in article 32dgfnF3kfn57U1@individual.net, "Paul - xxx"
<notcheckedever@hotmail.com> wrote:

> A nice, neat
> card, that is useless as a driving licence because when you need to do
> anything (To a policeman, say) you still have to provide proof of identity
> with the paper part it comes with ..

I thought it was the other way round. Teh photo card establishes
identity,the paper part establishes elegibility.

ICBW

...d

Paul - xxx

David Martin composed the following ...
> On 16/12/04 1:21 pm, in article 32dgfnF3kfn57U1@individual.net, "Paul -
> xxx" <notcheckedever@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> A nice, neat
>> card, that is useless as a driving licence because when you need to do
>> anything (To a policeman, say) you still have to provide proof of
>> identity with the paper part it comes with ..
>
> I thought it was the other way round. Teh photo card establishes
> identity,the paper part establishes elegibility.
>
> ICBW

ICBW & YCBR .. I dunno .. but generally you can't use one part without the
other, which seems farcicle to me ..

--
Paul ...
http://www.4x4prejudice.org/index.php
(8(!) Homer Rules ...
"A tosser is a tosser, no matter what mode of transport they're using."

Andy Dingley

On 16 Dec 2004 12:18:30 GMT, "Arthur Clune" <ajc22@york.ac.uk> wrote:

>I have very mixed feelings about this. I detest his policies, but
>admire him as a person hugely for what he has achieved. It's a shame
>he went the way he did IMO.

I really liked Blunkett when he ran Sheffield. But if power corrupts,
becoming Home Sec seems to turn them into power-crazed fruitbats
overnight.

Mark Thompson

> If they are to be used for identity, why not just throw away the card
> part and retain comparing the biometric data with that stored
> centrally.

I don't think the biometric data is 'individual' enough to be used on its
own.

[Not Responding]

On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 13:59:42 +0000, David Martin
<d.m.a.martin@dundee.ac.uk> wrote:

>On 16/12/04 1:21 pm, in article 32dgfnF3kfn57U1@individual.net, "Paul - xxx"
><notcheckedever@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> A nice, neat
>> card, that is useless as a driving licence because when you need to do
>> anything (To a policeman, say) you still have to provide proof of identity
>> with the paper part it comes with ..
>
>I thought it was the other way round. Teh photo card establishes
>identity,the paper part establishes elegibility.
>
>ICBW
>
>..d

Having not driven for a while and admittedly not having kept abreast
of legal changes when I did, is my manky scrap of paper still valid?
It's the original; never had to go back to Swansea for point adding.

Paul - xxx

[Not Responding] composed the following ...
> On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 13:59:42 +0000, David Martin
> <d.m.a.martin@dundee.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>> On 16/12/04 1:21 pm, in article 32dgfnF3kfn57U1@individual.net, "Paul -
>> xxx" <notcheckedever@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> A nice, neat
>>> card, that is useless as a driving licence because when you need to do
>>> anything (To a policeman, say) you still have to provide proof of
>>> identity with the paper part it comes with ..
>>
>> I thought it was the other way round. Teh photo card establishes
>> identity,the paper part establishes elegibility.
>>
>> ICBW
>>
>> ..d
>
> Having not driven for a while and admittedly not having kept abreast
> of legal changes when I did, is my manky scrap of paper still valid?
> It's the original; never had to go back to Swansea for point adding.

Yup ... Sent mine back for a change of address, they don't issue the
pink papers anymore.

--
Paul ...
http://www.4x4prejudice.org/index.php
(8(!) Homer Rules ...
"A tosser is a tosser, no matter what mode of transport they're using."

Andy Dingley

On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 13:18:55 -0000, "Epetruk" <nobody@blackhole.com>
wrote:

>In any case, nobody is saying (or should be saying)

But they are

> that ID cards should
>be unforgeable - they should just be good enough to establish one's
>identity to such a degree that the chances of you being someone else
>are minimal.

OK, I can go along with the idea of "benefits claimant cards".

I'm _against_ an "NHS card", because we're all entitled to it equally,
so there's no over-riding need to prove entitlement. As to bogus Daily
Wail readers claiming freebies from walk-in clinics, then that has a
lot to offer for improved STD or TB treatment around the fringes of
society, no matter who they are. By the level of dialysis tourism or
anti-retrovirals, the clinical involvement has gone beyond the simple
card anyway.

The main problem with ID cards though is the centralisation of them,
and their aggregated justification. Enormous lack of secrecy is
justified by TERRORism and their mandatory nature by BENEFIT
SCROUNGERS -- so Blunkett rolled these both together into mandatory
inspection of everything for all.

--
Smert' spamionam

Carol Hague

Arthur Clune <ajc22@york.ac.uk> wrote:

> I have very mixed feelings about this. I detest his policies, but
> admire him as a person hugely for what he has achieved. It's a shame
> he went the way he did IMO.

In fairness, nobody forced him to have an affair with a married woman.
His downfall was entirely of his own making

--
Carol
"Mmmmooooowooooff!" - the Moobark, "The Treacle People"

Trevor Barton

On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 13:18:55 -0000, Epetruk wrote:
> Trevor Barton wrote:
>> On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 12:34:12 -0000, Paul - xxx wrote:
>>> Epetruk composed the following ...
>>>
>>>> I don't think that ID cards are a bad thing in principle. However,
>>>> I don't think that the technology to be used and the cost of the
>>>> project justify introducing them at this time.
>>>
>>> I agree with this post ..
>>
>> And I fundamentally disagree with the premise that they are a good
>> thing. Not so much from a personal liberty POV (although that's also
>> a big issue), but from the point of view that they are not going to
>> achieve what the Govt wanted them to achieve. There is no way of
>> producing an unforgeable ID card,
>
> You sound like you've made up your mind on this one, so I don't think
> any new advances in technology will convince you otherwise.
>
> In any case, nobody is saying (or should be saying) that ID cards should
> be unforgeable - they should just be good enough to establish one's
> identity to such a degree that the chances of you being someone else
> are minimal.

Sadly no. The better the card is at establishing your identity as
real the more value it has to an individual, and consequently the
more value it has to the criminal.

>> and even if there was, there is no way of ensuring the system
>> of getting one is both un-foolable, and uncorruptable.
>
> As above.

Again no. The more difficult you make it to corrupt the system, the
more valuable the card to the bad person, and the more they will
be willing to pay. All you're doing is raising the price, but the
downside of that is that because the card is more valuable it will
be used to protect more valuable things, which makes it more desirable
to the baddy.

For example, most people's credit card limit is a few thousand pounds.
That means that it's not worth getting a fake card if it's going to
cost you a frew thousand pounds to do so. A strong ID card is
supposed to protect your whole identity. How much might that be
worth to someone? Hoe many people will there be in the supply
chain? How many of them would make a fake card for a few thousand
pounds? What about losing your card, there has to be some mechanism
for replacements. How hard would that be to corrupt? What about the
initial handout of cards, 60 million people getting cards all at
once, based on what verification? A gas bill? How many false cards
might you expect to be generated initially? One in 100? One in
10000? That leaves an aweful lot of rogue cards out there.

>> Rememeber, all of the 911 hijackers had valid ID, some of it was
>> false, and others were legitimate but obtained corruptly (and
>> some was legitimate and obtained legitimately).
>>
>> I will be entitled to an ID card. How does that prevent me from
>> driving a bomb into London and blowing it to smithereens, whatever
>> they are?
>
> I don't see the value of ID cards as a terrorist prevention measure -
> quite frankly, I can't understand that argument. To me, they are more
> valuable in preventing identity theft (which I believe is going to
> be a big issue in the future) and benefit fraud.

They may have limited use but that's where the civil liberties argument
is more important. But I won't get into that one ;-)

--
Trevor Barton

Epetruk

David Martin wrote:
> On 16/12/04 1:18 pm, in article 32dgacF3itl49U1@individual.net,
> "Epetruk" <nobody@blackhole.com> wrote:
>
>> In any case, nobody is saying (or should be saying) that ID cards
>> should be unforgeable - they should just be good enough to establish
>> one's identity to such a degree that the chances of you being
>> someone else are minimal.
>
> They will either be 'good enough' because they can be checked back at
> a central database, or they will be forgeable.

Eh, the question is one of degree. If they are *easily* forged, forget about
it. If they are very difficult to forge, then they are more useful. Striving
for 100% unforgeability is simply not practical in real life.

> If they are to be used for identity, why not just throw away the card
> part and retain comparing the biometric data with that stored
> centrally. After all, there is little chance of failing to carry
> biometric data with you.

Good idea - however, I think reading the information on the card reduces the
need to have the biometric information on a central database, except for
purposes of verifying that a newly created identity isn't a duplicate of an
already existing one.

Trevor Barton

On 16 Dec 2004 14:07:09 GMT, Mark Thompson wrote:
>> If they are to be used for identity, why not just throw away the card
>> part and retain comparing the biometric data with that stored
>> centrally.
>
> I don't think the biometric data is 'individual' enough to be used on its
> own.

And some of it, like fingerprint scanners, can be fooled.


--
Trevor Barton

Epetruk

Trevor Barton wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 13:18:55 -0000, Epetruk wrote:
>> Trevor Barton wrote:
>>> On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 12:34:12 -0000, Paul - xxx wrote:
>>>> Epetruk composed the following ...
>>>>
>>>>> I don't think that ID cards are a bad thing in principle. However,
>>>>> I don't think that the technology to be used and the cost of the
>>>>> project justify introducing them at this time.
>>>>
>>>> I agree with this post ..
>>>
>>> And I fundamentally disagree with the premise that they are a good
>>> thing. Not so much from a personal liberty POV (although that's also
>>> a big issue), but from the point of view that they are not going to
>>> achieve what the Govt wanted them to achieve. There is no way of
>>> producing an unforgeable ID card,
>>
>> You sound like you've made up your mind on this one, so I don't think
>> any new advances in technology will convince you otherwise.
>>
>> In any case, nobody is saying (or should be saying) that ID cards
>> should be unforgeable - they should just be good enough to establish
>> one's identity to such a degree that the chances of you being
>> someone else are minimal.
>
> Sadly no. The better the card is at establishing your identity as
> real the more value it has to an individual, and consequently the
> more value it has to the criminal.

True. But the question is - what will the overall negative impact of
this be? How much worse or better will things be with that situation
than if there are no ID cards?

>>> and even if there was, there is no way of ensuring the system
>>> of getting one is both un-foolable, and uncorruptable.
>>
>> As above.
>
> Again no. The more difficult you make it to corrupt the system, the
> more valuable the card to the bad person, and the more they will
> be willing to pay. All you're doing is raising the price, but the
> downside of that is that because the card is more valuable it will
> be used to protect more valuable things, which makes it more desirable
> to the baddy.

But surely, the more valuable the thing we want to protect, the more
proof of ID we will present. Right now, without any ID cards, we tender
a multiplicity of evidence that we are who we say we are - the more
important the thing, the more evidence we present. There is no reason
to change this procedure (i.e. if you wish to collect the important
thing, present your ID card with other evidence as well. Surely, that's
more reliable than just offering the evidence without any form of
biometrics).

> For example, most people's credit card limit is a few thousand pounds.
> That means that it's not worth getting a fake card if it's going to
> cost you a frew thousand pounds to do so. A strong ID card is
> supposed to protect your whole identity.

Well, that's not quite how I see it - I don't believe in the 'silver
bullet' solution myself, and neither should anyone else.

<snip>

> What about losing your card, there has to be some mechanism
> for replacements. How hard would that be to corrupt? What about the
> initial handout of cards, 60 million people getting cards all at
> once, based on what verification? A gas bill?

The cards don't have to be handed out at once. I think for projects
like this, a gradual roll out where the cards are used side by side
with regular verification is what is best (just like what's being done
with the Chip-and-Pin rollout).

As to verification, well I assume it will be several of the standard
verification that you would use to obtain any important service (not
just a single utility bill).

> How many false cards might you expect to be generated initially?
> One in 100? One in 10000? That leaves an aweful lot of rogue cards
> out there.

A lot of the answers to these questions depend on the available
technology out there - and I admit that we aren't quite there yet.

>>> Rememeber, all of the 911 hijackers had valid ID, some of it was
>>> false, and others were legitimate but obtained corruptly (and
>>> some was legitimate and obtained legitimately).
>>>
>>> I will be entitled to an ID card. How does that prevent me from
>>> driving a bomb into London and blowing it to smithereens, whatever
>>> they are?
>>
>> I don't see the value of ID cards as a terrorist prevention measure -
>> quite frankly, I can't understand that argument. To me, they are more
>> valuable in preventing identity theft (which I believe is going to
>> be a big issue in the future) and benefit fraud.
>
> They may have limited use but that's where the civil liberties
> argument is more important. But I won't get into that one ;-)

Please don't! You'll end up using my entire argument bandwidth!

--
Akin

aknak at aksoto dot idps dot co dot uk